ABDUL-JALIL Sports and Entertainment Law Cases in All Major College’s Juris Doctorate Law (JD) and Masters in Business Administration (MBA) Programs MBA Programs

Professional Sports and Baseball History with Angles owner Gene Autry

ABDUL-JALIL Contracts, Finance, Interest, Loans, Reserve/Free Agency System and Restraint of Trade, Sherman Anti-trust Act (15 USC § 1,2), NLRA, Labor Exemption from Antitrust Law, Collective Bargaining, Labor law, Antitrust, Federal Arbitration, Civil Rights, cases taught in All Major Juris Doctorate Law and Masters in Business Administration Programs in the U.S. Colleges and Universities!

Outfielder Lyman Bostock, on his 27th birthday, signed a five-year contract with the California Angels Monday for a $3.5 million plus-the most lucrative deal ever for a team sport athlete.

The unprecedented deal included a FULLY GUARANTEED, five year, $600,000 annual salary, $500,000 signing bonus, a $500,000 Interest free loan, and a $200,000 Interest free business contract loan! The FULLY GUARANTEED contract was PAID in full, after he was murdered on the last day of his first year of the contract with five years left to perform!

In a Historical, Unprecedented case in Sports and Professional Basketball, Abdul-Jalil and Superstar Management, along with NBA player Brian Taylor, negotiated an addendum to the standard NBA contract with the Denver Nuggets for a $250.000 interest free loan and making the contract “tax free”.

Taylor had a clause that stipulated be could become a free agent if the Nuggets breeched his contract in any manner.

The Nuggets made the first payment of $50,000 due him on time. He said they were 19 days late on the second payment before making a partial payment. The third payment, which was due Jan. 1, was over 13 days late, according to Taylor. They did.

So, in mid-season the team had sufficiently breached the contract, according to Jalil, defaulting by 13 days on the final part of a $250,000 interest free loan with the late payments that triggered the clause in the addendum that allowed Taylor to opt out of the contract. Taylor withheld his services from that point in the middle of the season.

Taylor’s agent, Abdul Jalil, said in NewYork that Taylor becomes a free agent immediately should the Nuggets deviate from any portion of the agreement. Jalil said the agreement is unique in that it contains a clause providing that should Taylor sign with another NBA team, Denver, may not receive compensation in the form of players, or draft choices. The compensation must be in the form of cash, half of which goes to Taylor and half to the Nuggets.

This clause reportedly was unprecedented in major league sports player contracts and expects NBA Commissioner Larry O’Brien to call a Collective Bargaining Federal Arbitration hearing on the case because the contract clause is so unique.

Jalil is the agent who represented baseball infielder Junior Moore, who won free agency from the Atlanta Braves in a landmark contract agreement following the 1977 season in a Federal Arbitration case of Moore (MLBPA) vs. Atlanta Braves (MLB). Moore’s contract permitted him to declare himself a free agent based on his own value judgment of the amount of playing time he had with the Braves. Used as only a part-time performer, Moore chose to leave Atlanta and signed with the Chicago White Sox.

The unprecedented case in Professional Sports and Basketball was necessary as the the addendum to the contract was the result of Taylor’s dispute of the contract that was originally negotiated by the players union director Larry Fleisher. The inherent problems that this situation provided for the National Basketball Association, the Denver Nuggets, and most importantly the Director of the NBA Players Union and the Union itself, were incredible, FILLED WITH CONFLICTS OF INTEREST, MULTIPLE INSTANCES OF FRAUD, COLLUSION, and MISREPRESENTATION! The case was so bad that Larry Fleisher, the Director of the NBA Players Union and the Union itself, could NOT represent Taylor in the Federal Arbitration hearing.

In mid-season the team breached the contract with a late payment that triggered a clause in the addendum that allowed him to opt out of the contract. The player withheld his services in the middle of the season and the Nuggets and the NBA filed for Federal Arbitration. In prevailing in this matter, Taylor received his FULL PAY, an interest free loan, was declared free of his contract (“a Free Agent”), and allowed to negotiate a new contract with the team of his choice. Cite Arbitration Decision in the matter of “The National Basketball Association (Denver Nuggets) vs. The National Basketball Players Association (Brian Taylor)”, Jan. 25, 1978.

The Nuggets declined to have tapes of the Taylor negotiating sessions heard by renowned federal arbitrator Peter Seitz, who agreed Taylor was free, but that the Nuggets were due compensation.

“The Major Leagues of Professional Baseball Clubs (Atlanta Braves) vs. The Major League Baseball Players Association (Alvin Jr. Moore)” He negotiated a professional Baseball contract for a rookie player that contained several special clauses and one that allowed him to declare himself a “Free Agent” in the middle of the season if he was dissatisfied with his playing time. http://www.box.net/shared/4apqfv9fpg

The National Baseball League President ruled against the clause citing that “it contained provisions inconsistent with the Reserve System Articles of the new Basic Labor Agreement” and threw it out, whereupon he took the case to arbitration. He prevailed in this case of unprecedented legal rights benefits and it was hailed by the Director of the Players Union, Marvin Miller, as “the single greatest advancement of player rights in baseball history and as valuable as any inherent rights in the Major League Players current Basic Labor Agreement. This clause became the industry standard and was the example distributed to all other representatives by the Players Union to be included in their contracts. Cite: Arbitration Decision No.32 in the matter of “The Major Leagues of Professional Baseball Clubs (Atlanta Braves) vs. The Major League Baseball Players Association (Alvin Jr. Moore)”, Sept. 7, 1977.

He negotiated a series of contracts that included many unprecedented benefits to the individual clients, one of which was interest-free loans that could be forgiven. Upon review by the Internal Revenue Service, the contracts and  returns where thrown out and challenged by the IRS as the IRS filed suit. After an 8 year legal battle, he prevailed in Federal Tax Court and established that Interest free Loans where in fact legal. This unprecedented legal ruling was established as a standard in the Tax Laws and was written in several National Law Journals. Cite: 
“IRS vs Al-Hakim” published by Commerce Clearing House(CCH) Tax Court Memorandum Cases editions KF 6234A 505 and Maxwell McMillian (Prentice Hall) Federal Tax Cases edition KF 6234A 512 Tax Court Memorandum Decisions. Articles and citations available upon request….
The Historic “al-Hakim” Tax Code §7872 [692] Ruling
After al-Hakim’s victory in the Federal Tax Courts against the Tax Commissioner, in

Abdul-Jalil

December 2000 the IRS moved to change the Tax Codes with the historic “al-Hakim” Tax Code §7872 [692] Ruling. The IRS changed the Federal Tax Codes such that it now “prevents no-interest loans” and was instituted to eliminate and close the Federal Income Tax loop-hole created with al-Hakim’s use of interest free loans in sports and entertainment financial transactions.
CITE: Tax Notes, Dec. 4, 2000, p. 1311; 89 Tax Notes 1311 (Dec. 4, 2000) “al-Hakim Tax Code” Ruling
al-Hakim’s victory in the Federal Tax Court over the U. S. Tax Commissioner has the nations foremost academic institutions and academians in the study of Law and Business teaching al-Hakim’s use of interest free loans in Tax Free financial transactions as part of the Law and Business curriculum in such hallowed halls as Harvard University, Yale University,Washington University, Stanford University, University of Virginia, and Wake Forest University Schools of Law Federal Tax Courses, among others.

Washington University School of Law Federal Tax Course,
Professor: Bixby;
Yale University School of Law Federal Tax Course,

Professor: Eric M. Zolt
Text Authors: William A. Klein, Joseph Bankman, Daniel N. Shaviro;

University of Virginia School of Law Federal Tax Course,
Professor: M. Robinson * Federal Income Taxation * L. Dominick
Text Authors: William A. Klein, Joseph Bankman, Daniel N. Shaviro;
Washington & Lee University School of Law Federal Tax Course,

Harvard University School of Law Federal Income Taxation Course Outline,
Professor: Flusche
al-Hakim’s victory in the Federal Tax Court over the U. S. Tax Commissioner has academians teaching al-Hakim’s use of interest free loans in Tax Free financial transactions as part of a Wake Forest University School of Law Federal Tax Course on “ISLAMIC AND JEWISH PERSPECTIVES ON INTEREST” and al-Hakim’s historic impact on Shariah-Riba Complaint financial transactions in the business world.
Wake Forest University School of Law Tax Course on “ISLAMIC & JEWISH PERSPECTIVES ON INTEREST”,

Jalil with Robert Shapiro and Bill Walsh

Author/Professor: Newman, Joel S.
al-Hakim’s victory in the Federal Tax Court over the U. S. Tax Commissioner has academians teaching al-Hakim’s use of interest free loans in Tax Free financial transactions as part of the Wake Forest University School of Law Federal Tax Course on “ISLAMIC AND JEWISH PERSPECTIVES ON INTEREST” and al-Hakim’s historic impact on Shariah-Riba Complaint financial transactions in the business world.
Joel S. Newman is a professor at Wake Forest Law School, Winston Salem, North Carolina.
In this report, Newman discusses financial transactions that allow devout Muslims and Jews to obey religious prohibitions against interest, while giving investors a return on their investments. The tax treatment of these transactions is considered. An integral part is al-Hakim’s case.
1977-

The Historic BALSA 1979 National Law Convention The historic Black American Law Students Association, 11th Annual National Convention, March 28-April 1, 1979, Hyatt, Oakland, was themed: “The Reconstruction of Black Civilizations.” Dedicated to- Rev. Ben Chavis of the Wilmington Ten, Introduction- Mayor Lionel Wilson, Keynote Speaker- Min. Louis Farrakhan, with veritable “Who’s Who” of nations leading Black presenters: Junius Williams-Pres. NBA, Hon. Ben Travis, Abdul-Jalil al-Hakim, Don Warden (Khalid al-Mansour), Dave Wilmont-Georgetown Law Center; Howard Moore, Alfred Slocum- Rutgers School of Law, Angela Davis, Victor Goode- Ex. Dir. NCBL, Hon. Judith Ford, Herb Reed- Howard School of Law, Asa Hilliard, Nathan Hare, Ron Baily- Northwestern University, Michael Ashburne, David Hall- FTC, Denice Carty Bernia- North Eastern University; Moot Court Judges: Hon. Wiley Manuel, Hon. Clinton White, Hon. David Cunningham, Hon. Allen Broussard, with “Thanks” to -John Burris, Peter Cohen, Claude Ames, Robert Harris, Eva Patterson, George Holland.

CASES PUBLISHED IN UNIVERSITIES LAW REVIEWS, ENTERTAINMENT AND SPORTS COURSE OUTLINES AND PUBLICATIONS on ALVIN MOORE LANDMARK LEGAL CASE

Case Western Law Review

Case Western Reserve Law Review Volume 31 Summer 1981 Number 4

A Long Deep Drive to Collective Bargaining: Of Players, Owners, Brawls, and Strikes.

Professor Robert C. Berry, Professor William B. Gould

Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons

UMass School Law

University of Massachusetts- Amherst

Major League Baseball’s Grievance Arbitration System

by Glenn M. Wong, Professor of Sports Law

Entertainment and Sports Law

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Marquette University School of Law Sports Law Institute

Marquette University School of Law

Entertainment and Sports Law Commons Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons

Interpreting the NFL Player Contract

Professor Gary R. Roberts

Marquette Sports Law Review- Volume 3, Issue 1, Article 5, Fall

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Vanderbilt University School of Law

Vanderbilt University School of Law

Sports Law – Knight Commission: purpose was to examine NCAA athletics and make recommendations

Professor Joseph Fishman

Studocu

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UNLV Boyd School of Law- Sports Lawyers

University of Nevada-Las Vegas William S. Boyd School of Law

Course: Sports Law: Competition Law | National Collegiate Athletic Association

Professor Marc Kligman, Adjunct. Sports Law

University of Nevada William S. Boyd School of Law

UNLV 87169927

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Santa Clara University School of Law

Santa Clara University School of Law

Legal Professions: Sports Law

The Role of the Commissioner and Other Governing Authorities

Professor Alan W. Scheflin – Santa Clara Law

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Quimbee Law School Case Briefs, Overview, Casebooks, study aids, BAR Review, and online Continuing Legal Education (CLE) courses

Quimbee Law School Case Briefs, Overview, Casebooks, study aids, BAR Review, and online Continuing Legal Education (CLE) courses

Alvin Moore vs Atlanta Braves

Major League Baseball Arbitration Proceeding

MLB-MLBPA Arb. 77-18 (1977)

Professor A. Porter

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Course Hero Law School Case Briefs

Course Hero Sports Law Outline

1968 Basic Agreement made the Commissioner the arbitrator clearly allowing for arbitration of reserve system grievances.
University of Texas School of Law

Course Title: LAW 111

6) Agent Representation – The collective agreement plays the ultimate governing role

Quizlet Law School Case Briefs

Quizlet, Sports Law 1-3

Alvin Moore & Atlanta Braves (1977)

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Judd’s Sports Law Outline

SPORTS LAW OUTLINE

Chapter 1 – Best Interests of the Sport: The Role of the Commissioner and Other Governing Authorities

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NetSuite Inc:

Alvin Moore & Atlanta Braves …

D. Arbitration as an Exclusive Remedy; § 301 Preemption

LECTURER AND PRESENTER IN THE FIELDS OF:

*ENTERTAINMENT LAW*
*THE ART OF REPRESENTING PROFESSIONAL ATHLETES AND ENTERTAINERS*
*REPRESENTING THE PRODUCER*
*REPRESENTING THE DIRECTOR*
*REPRESENTING THE SUPERSTAR*
*GETTING MONEY FOR YOUR MOVIE*
*LICENSING MOTION PICTURES*

*DIGITAL MOVIEMAKING*
*THE BUSINESS OF SPORTS*
*THE BUSINESS OF ENTERTAINMENT*
*SPORTS AND ENTERTAINMENT MARKETING*
*ADVERTISING, MARKETING, PROMOTION, SPONSORSHIPS, BRANDING AND HIP HOP CULTURE*
*HIP HOP AND THE SPREAD OF ISLAM*
*ISLAM AND MUSIC*

1995 Sports Image Awards Program Cover

~Leon Powe’s “Powe Folks” Basketball Camp, Oakland, CA. 2006-8, ~ Lynn Harris’ “Fourth Quarter Athletics Basketball Showcase” (with Ashley and Courtney Paris(OU), Devanei Hampton (Cal), Alexis Gray-Lawson (Cal), Candice Wiggins (Stanford), Brooke Smith (Stanford), and Ashley Walker(Cal), Oakland, CA. 2006, Golden State Warriors Adonal Foyle’s “Athletics and Academics” Basketball Camp, Oakland, CA. 2006, ~Music in Islam, University of California, Berkeley, CA 2003~ National Islamic Convention, Seacaucus., NJ 1997,~ Host Evening of Elegance, National Arabic Conference, Oakland, CA. 1997,~ National Islamic Convention, N.Y.C, N.Y. 1996,~ International Islamic Conference, Los Angeles, CA. 1996,~ Oaktown Music Conference, Oakland, CA 1996,~
National Society of Black Engineers Conference-Region 6, San Luis Obispo, CA.  1992,~ CAREER FEST, Oakland, CA. 1986, ~ California State University, Hayward, CA.  1985,~
United States Coast Guard, Oakland, CA.  1982,~
National BALSA Law Conference, Houston, TX 1981,~ National BALSA Law Conference, Philadelphia, PA. 1982,~ National BALSA Law Conference, Oakland, CA. 1979,~ National BALSA Law Conference, N.Y.C., N.Y. 1980,~ Mountain Regional Law Convention, Oklahoma City, OK. 1980,~ College of Alameda, Alameda, CA.  1981,~
Eastern Regional Law Conference, Washington D.C. 1980,~ National Black Media Convention, Oakland, CA. 1972,~ National BALSA Law Conference, Washington D.C. 1976,~
Pacific Coast Law Conference, San Francisco, CA. 1976,~ Stanford Law Society, Palo Alto, CA. 1976,~ National Black History Week Awards, San Francisco, CA, 1974

Abdul-Jalil’s Profile

“In another religion they honor people who serve like you with Sainthood!”” – Economics Professor Adeel Malik, Oxford University, England and World Renowned News Expert Commentator, speaking about Abdul-Jalil and the Aaron & Margaret Wallace Foundation. “GOD sent me an ANGEL!”” – Hammer, speaking about Abdul-Jalil.   “Jalil, YOU ARE A TZADIK (SAINT)!”– Barry Barkan, Live …
Continue reading Abdul-Jalil’s Profile

ABDUL-JALIL- the First “SUPER AGENT”

ABDUL-JALIL- the First “SUPER AGENT” “In another religion they honor people who serve like you with Sainthood!”” – Economics Professor Adeel Malik, Oxford University, England and World Renowned News Expert Commentator, speaking about Abdul-Jalil and the Aaron & Margaret Wallace Foundation. “GOD sent me an ANGEL!”” – Hammer, speaking about Abdul-Jalil.   “Jalil, YOU ARE A …
Continue reading ABDUL-JALIL- the First “SUPER AGENT”

The Legal Impact of the Historic Alvin “Junior” Moore Unprecedented Landmark Sports Contract Case

One of the earliest Professional Sports contract controversies involved Major League Baseball Player Free Agency that arose as the result of an unprecedented, landmark contract between Alvin “Junior” Moore and the Atlanta Braves in which a Special Covenant gave Moore the right to demand a trade which could not be consummated without his prior consent if he was dissatisfied with his playing time. In the event that a trade could not be consummated by the end of the 1977 championship season, Moore would become a free agent if he so desired.
Alvin “Junior” Moore was only a rookie, yet here are the terms of the contract his agent Abdul-Jalil put together for him:
-The Braves were to pay Moore $75,000 that season. That was only his salary.
-They also were to pay him a $50,000 bonus and provide him with an additional $50,000 interest-free loan.
That’s was historic for a rookie, but wait, there’s more coming.
The imaginative, foresighted agent Abdul-Jalil saw to it that four other unique clauses were written into the Atlanta Braves contract of Moore.
“If Moore is dissatisfied with his playing time, he can submit a letter to the Braves notifying them of same, who then must initiate a trade to the team of Moore’s choice, which can only be consummated with his consent. If there is no trade by the end of the season, the contract is voided and he becomes a free agent.”

1) The first unique clause gave Moore the option of demanding a trade to another team of his choice upon his notice to the team of his dissatisfaction with his playing time; becoming a free agent simply by notifying the Braves of his intention, which works out to be the same as anytime he choses. Under the present Basic Agreement between the players and the owners, a player becomes a free agent ONLY after six-year service requirement with a team has been fulfilled AND only after the second year he plays for a team without signing a contract the previous year.

2) The second unique clause allowed Moore to veto any trade the Braves might involve him in if he did not approve of the team in the proposed trade;

3) The third unique clause gave him the option of choosing the team he wished to be traded to;

4) The forth unique clause gave Moore the option of becoming a free agent if a trade to a team of his choice in not consummated. Under the then present Basic Agreement between the players and the owners, a player becomes a free agent the second year only after he plays for a team without signing a contract the previous year.
What club owner in the world would ever sign a rookie to a contract like that?
The contract was signed by Ted Turner, the Braves’ owner, March 14, 1977.
When National League President Chub Feeney first saw Moore’s contract and its special freedom clause, he rejected it disapproving this Special Covenant and on April 28, Feeney, wrote a letter to Bill Lucas, the Braves’ Director of Player Personnel.
The letter said:
“Specific covenants contained in Alvin Moore’s contract are disapproved because it (the contract) contains provisions inconsistent with the reserve system article of the new Basic Agreement.
Please be sure the player receives a copy of this letter.”
The Major League Baseball Players Association (MLBPA) filed a Federal grievance on the ground that actual or potential additional benefits were provided for the player within the meaning of the collective agreement. The clubs maintained that the free agency provisions in the 1976 agreement were exclusive, providing the only basis upon which free agency rights could be exercised.
But the union argued that there were still other avenues to free agency, such as an unconditional release by a club because the player was not sufficiently qualified. The arbitrator held, in this case, that “the six-year service requirement through which a player could exercise free agency was for the individual club’s benefit in the sense that it would want to retain the player for a particular period of time.” Thus, the benefit of “long-term title and reservation rights” could be waived by the club. On the other hand, the reentry mechanism through which other clubs would have an opportunity to negotiate with a player who becomes a free agent was a matter covered by all the collective bargaining agreement, so an attempt by club and player to evade such procedures would be “inconsistent” and thus prohibited. Said the Arbitrator:
There is clear merit in the Association’s argument that the words “additional benefits to the Player” should be liberally construed to support a wide variety of benefits to a Player over and above the benefits accorded to him by the Basic Agreement. Though covenants containing such benefits may be “inconsistent” with a particular provision of the Agreement dealing with the same subject matter, there is logic in the Association’s argument that they are not, in fact, “inconsistent” because Article II authorizes such inconsistencies where they provide additional benefits to the Player.”?

Marvin Miller, the MLBPA Executive Director said “Junior Moore’s contract has done more for baseball as anything in the basic agreement just signed by the Players Association and the owners”
CASES PUBLISHED IN UNIVERSITIES LAW REVIEWS, ENTERTAINMENT AND SPORTS COURSE OUTLINES AND PUBLICATIONS

Case Western Reserve Law Review Volume 31 Summer 1981 Number 4
A Long Deep Drive to Collective Bargaining: Of Players, Owners, Brawls, and Strikes.
Professor Robert C. Berry, Professor William B. Gould
Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons

A Long Deep Drive to Collective Bargaining: Of Players, Owners, Brawls, and Strikes.
c. Individual v. Collective Interests. The case law of labor arbitration addresses a number of important issues as it explores the inner workings of a league. Cases which confront the tensions between the individual and the collective interest of the players are of particular importance to this analysis. Individuals may not always be served best by collective action. The individual may be able to obtain advantages for himself that run counter to agreements forged between the union and management. These individual advantages often must be curtailed, as the earlier discussions on the unit504 and exclusivity505 have revealed. An examination of some of these problems in the baseball context sharpens the focus. The Moore506 decision arose out of a special covenant between Alvin Moore and the Atlanta Braves. The National League President disapproved of this arrangement on the ground that the covenant was “inconsistent” with the basic agreement.507 The covenant stated that Moore could not be traded without his consent and could become a free agent at the end of the 1977 championship season “if he so desires.” 508 The players association challenged the disapproval of the contract in a grievance. The players association argued that the individual contract could not be regarded as “inconsistent” with the collective agreement since it accorded benefits not available under the basic agreement. The clubs contended that the covenant struck “at the very heart” of the negotiated reserve system. The argument was that the Braves, by providing free agency for Moore without reference to the contractual scheme contained in the collective agreement, ignored the other clubs’ interest in maintaining a competitive balance-the very objective of the negotiated reserve system.509 At the time the grievance was filed, Moore did not have six years service in the major leagues-a prerequisite to free agency under the labor contract between the parties. The covenant, moreover, made no reference to the quota and compensation provisions of the basic agreement. In response, the association noted that the agreement contemplated free agency through methods other than the reentry draft. By way of rejoinder, the clubs maintained that these other avenues were designed for players whose careers were ending, younger players, players of marginal skills or a default by the club.510 With regard to the former category, the clubs contended that “[lt was never contemplated that promises of outright release or termination would or could be used by individual Clubs and Players as a negotiating device or bargaining chip in order to evade the reentry procedure and other aspects of the reserve system.” 511 The arbitration panel held there was no reason that Moore could not negotiate conditional rights either to be traded or to become a free agent. The opinion stated: There is clear merit in the Association’s argument that the words ‘additional benefits to the Player’ should be liberally construed to support a wide variety of benefits to a player over and above the benefits accorded to him by the Basic Agreement. Though covenants containing such benefits may be “inconsistent” with a particular provision of the Agreement dealing with the same subject matter, there is logic in the Association’s argument that they are not, in fact, ‘inconsistent’ because Article II authorizes such inconsistencies where they provide additional benefits to the Player. The evidence… suggests the League Presidents have approved a number of special covenants in this light, where the ‘additional benefits to the Player’ were within the Club’s power to bestow. 512 Inasmuch as the Braves were not terminating Moore for lack of playing skill, the arbitrator decided that Moore could not escape the reentry draft provided for in the collective bargaining agreement. The procedure and “its related quota provisions protect the interests of all 26 Clubs and cannot be waived by the Atlanta Club in the circumstances of this case. 513 The fact is, however, that the modification of the length of service provisions negotiated between Atlanta and Moore, and circumvention of the reentry draft procedures, may affect the competitive balance in the league so as to promote the interests of some other clubs. If, for example, certain superstars became available earlier than provided for in the collective agreement, the resulting bidding wars would benefit wealthier teams such as the Yankees, Angels, and Braves. If, in contrast, the number of talented free agents available depressed the market, the impact could be immediate and substantial. In some instances, the players rather than the owners would be adversely affected. It is thus difficult to establish a clearly logical demarcation between length of service and other aspects of the reentry draft since one element protects the clubs in the league and the other does not. The Moore decision is probably the correct one. The additional benefits secured by individual players must be reconciled with the overriding procedures established by the collective agreement’s reentry draft. The second important case involved Mike Marshall, the 1974 Cy Young Award winner and erstwhile relief pitcher for the Minnesota Twins, among others.514 Marshall negotiated a special covenant with the Twins which permitted him to become a free agent after the 1978 season but “without regard to the compensation provisions therein.”515 The arbitrator, following Moore, concluded that the compensation provisions were designed for the benefit of all clubs and not merely the individual club which lost the player to free agency. While the arbitrator conceded that the club losing the player might waive its right to compensation, it would not waive the “detriment” or “cost” that the signing club would incur in the normal reentry draft procedure. 516 The recent Dave Winfield free agency episode created another problem. The Yankees, fearful that they would not be one of the thirteen teams able to draft Winfield, reportedly negotiated with the Padres to provide for an agreement between the Yankees and Winfield and a trade between the Padres and the Yankees based on that deal.517 This alleged agreement circumvented the reentry draft procedure and compensation and, in theory, imposed a cost on the signing club. The players association, however, accepted this procedure as compatible with the agreement because Winfield was able to use the prospect of free agency, limited only by the amateur draft compensation, as a vehicle to bargain for acceptable contract terms. The final group of baseball-related cases involve option clauses and right of refusal clauses in special covenants. In 1976, Carlton Fisk, Rick Burleson, and Gary Maddox negotiated provisions giving their respective clubs the right of first refusal at the end of their contracts. Their theory was that a player could reap the financial benefits of a bidding war while remaining with the club in cities like Boston and New York where there are many fringe benefits to being a famous ballplayer. The association objected to these covenants on the theory that they inevitably depress the bidding between clubs. An arbitrator took the position that a right of first refusal “could not possibly produce anything better than free agency.”‘ 518 This position seems flawed given the advantages that players might reap from such a provision. To take an extreme example, players cannot waive their right to be part of the free agent draft after six years, although they may do so indirectly by entering into a long-term contract. The grievance thus was settled in favor of the association 519 — a further step toward collectivizing the relationship. Another important variation on this theme of individual-collective tension involves negotiated option clauses. The Carlton Fisk award 520 decided that substantial performance by the Red Sox was not adequate to meet the option tender date of December 20 established under the collective agreement. 521 The arbitrator rejected the club’s reliance on extreme forfeiture as an excuse of the condition since the Red Sox already had received Fisk’s performance for salary paid between 1976 and 1980. This rationale is questionable in light of Fisk’s inability to play during most of 1979-although Fisk played in 1980 under adverse circumstances. The arbitrator’s comment that free agency status for Fisk was an “unfortunate consequence for the Club in comparison to the minor inconvenience to him flowing from the related contract tender”522 understates the matter. Another option clause case, the Tidrow arbitration,523 was of more precedental value. Tidrow, prior to joining the Chicago Cubs, signed a contract with the Yankees for 1977 to 1979 and then in 1978 negotiated an extension for 1980. The contract provided for compensation, some of it deferred, and stated that the club reserved the right to exercise an option on Tidrow’s services at a salary of $200,000 for 1981 by notifying Tidrow before December 20, 1980.524 The renewal option was exercised by a letter dated August 28, 1980. The players association objected to the renewal which purportedly blocked Tidrow’s access to the reentry draft on the ground that the special covenant containing the option did not constitute an actual or potential benefit to the player.525 The club contended that Tidrow had executed a contract for the succeeding season which was a contractual limitation on free agency rights. The arbitrator, however, held that the individual contract’s special covenants referred to the 1980 season.526 Tidrow thus could not be deemed to have executed a contract for 1981. The arbitrator also concluded that the agreement extracted from Tidrow all irrevocable offers to enter into a future contract. Moreover, since the players association successfully resisted incorporation of an option year in the collective agreement as a prerequisite to free agency–except for players like Fisk who had contracted prior to August 9, 1976 527 .-the arbitrator found the bargaining history to be “strong evidence” of an intent not to eliminate free agency through an option clause.528 Since Moore held that a contract could be inconsistent and yet acceptable if it provided an actual or potential benefit, further arbitral inquiry was requested. The arbitrator discussed the contention that Tidrow had benefitted through the economic “package” that he received with a guaranteed contract rather than the standard contract. Any detriment, reasoned the arbitrator, could be offset by a potential benefit. The option clause, however, must provide its own benefit. Tidrow, experienced in negotiations and aware of free agency’s benefits, could have perceived an option clause as being more advantageous. In making his determination, the arbitrator found the following to be conclusive: “By remaining silent until the latter part of 1979 and retaining $100,000 in bonuses for signing the contract he now seeks to overturn, Tidrow led the Cubs-who acquired his contract in apparent good faith-to act in reliance on his evident acceptance of all of its terms.”529 Tidrow accordingly was estopped because of his tardy disavowal, his actual or constructive knowledge that he was losing free agency, and detrimental reliance by the Cubs. While the arbitrator stated that clubs might attempt to circumvent the collective agreement through such covenants as making optional renewal clauses a condition precedent to all contracts, such was not the case in Tidrow. Tidrow is thus a “narrow holding” which again emphasizes the tension between collective and individual interests.

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504. See notes 462-70 supra and accompanying text.
505. See notes 471-503 supra and accompanying text.
506. Major Leagues of Professional Baseball Clubs v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n (Moore), No. 77-18 (Sept. 7, 1977) (on file at Case Western Reserve Law Review).
507. Id at 2.
508. Id
509. Id at 8.
510. Id at 11-12.
511. Id at 12.
512. Id at 14-15.
513. Id at 17. CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [
514. Major Leagues of Professional Baseball Clubs v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n (Marshall v. Minnesota Twins), No. 78-15 (Oct. 25, 1978) (unpublished) (on file at Case Western Reserve Law Review).
515. Id at 2.
516. Id at 13-14.
517. See Yanks Seek to Land Win/feld Before He is a FreeAgent, N.Y. Times, Oct 22, 1980, § 2, at 5, col. 1; Winfield Optsfor Free Agency, Stalling Deal to Become Yankee, N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1981, § 4, at 19, col. 4. [Vol 31:685 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
518. Decision of the Arbitration Panel, Major League Baseball Players Ass’n v. Chicago Cubs (Tidrow), No. 80-18 (Nov. 4, 1980) (on file at Case Western Reserve Law Review) [hereinafter cited as Tidrow].
519. “The league presidents who originally approved the contracts [Lynn, Burleson, Fisk, and Maddox] since have strickened those clauses.” Chass, Miller Sees4 Ripoffin Agents’Acts, N.Y. Times, Jan. 27, 1977, § C, at 25, coL 1.
520. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n (Fisk), No. 80-35, (Feb. 12, 1981) (unpublished) [hereinafter cited as Fisk].
521. See note 378 supra. 19811 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
522. Fisk, supra note 520, at 20.
523. See Tidrow, supra note 518 and accompanying text.
524. Clubs’ Memorandum, Major League Baseball Players Ass’n v. Chicago Cubs 3 (Tidrow), No. 80-18 (Nov. 4, 1980) (on file at Case Western Reserve Law Review).
525. Id at 14-15.
526. See Tidrow, supra note 518 and accompanying text.
527. See Tidrow, supra note 518, at 19.
528. See Tidrow, supra note 518, at 16.
529. Id
[Vol. 31:685 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
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University of Massachusetts- Amherst
Major League Baseball’s Grievance Arbitration System
by Glenn M. Wong, Professor of Sports Law
Entertainment and Sports Law

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Marquette University School of Law
Entertainment and Sports Law Commons Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons
Interpreting the NFL Player Contract
Professor Gary R. Roberts
Marquette Sports Law Review- Volume 3, Issue 1, Article 5, Fall

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Vanderbilt University School of Law
Sports Law – Knight Commission: purpose was to examine NCAA athletics and make recommendations
Professor Joseph Fishman
Studocu

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University of Nevada-Las Vegas William S. Boyd School of Law
Course: Sports Law: Competition Law | National Collegiate Athletic Association
Professor Marc Kligman, Adjunct. Sports Law
University of Nevada William S. Boyd School of Law
UNLV 87169927

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Santa Clara University School of Law
Legal Professions: Sports Law
The Role of the Commissioner and Other Governing Authorities
Professor Alan W. Scheflin – Santa Clara Law

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Quimbee Law School Case Briefs, Overview, Casebooks, study aids, BAR Review, and online Continuing Legal Education (CLE) courses
Alvin Moore vs Atlanta Braves
Major League Baseball Arbitration Proceeding
MLB-MLBPA Arb. 77-18 (1977)
Professor A. Porter

Facts
Alvin Moore (plaintiff) signed a one-year contract with the Atlanta Braves. The contract contained a clause that said if Moore was not satisfied with his playing time, the Braves were required to trade him to a team approved by Moore. The covenant also stated that if a trade were not completed by the end of the season, Moore was allowed to become a free agent if he so chose. At the time, Moore had less than one year of service in Major League Baseball (MLB). The league president (defendant) disapproved of this covenant. The president believed that the covenant was inconsistent with the collective-bargaining agreement agreed to by the league and the players’ union. This agreement required players to have a minimum of five years of service in MLB before they could become eligible for free agency. The players’ union filed a grievance on Moore’s behalf. The union cited the collective-bargaining agreement’s clause permitting special covenants that benefit players. The union maintained that the president could disapprove of a special covenant only if the covenant did not benefit the player. The league countered that this covenant effectively created an entirely new reserve system, contrary to what the league and players had previously agreed to. According to the league, the reserve system created by the collective-bargaining agreement was created to provide for an even and equitable distribution of players among all of the teams. Additionally, the collective-bargaining agreement contained a free agent re-entry procedure. By giving Moore the ability to determine his own free agency, the league argued, the covenant contravened the agreed-upon system. The league contended that a covenant that violated the collective-bargaining agreement and the rights of the other 25 MLB teams could not be permitted to stand simply because it benefited a player. The issue was brought before an arbitrator.

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Course Hero Sports Law Outline
1968 Basic Agreement made the Commissioner the arbitrator clearly allowing for arbitration of reserve system grievances.
University of Texas School of Law
Course Title: LAW 111

6) Agent Representation – The collective agreement plays the ultimate governing role
a) The most prominent agents are lawyers who must know the collective agreement for the sport. It exercises considerable influence on the player K.
 b) Alvin Moore & Atlanta Braves
– There are 3 reasons for the league president to disapprove a special covenant (Baseball)
i) If the covenant does not actually or potentially provide additional benefits to the Player 
ii) If the covenant violates an applicable law or is prohibited by a League rule not inconsistent with the collective agreement.
iii) If the covenant purports to bind some third party whom the Club and Player have no authority to bind.
(1)Individual Player-Club negotiations are conducted within the framework of the attendant rules, agreements, and regulations that govern the sport.
(2)Variations in any of the provisions might give a Player additional benefit beyond the Club’s power to make

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Quizlet, Sports Law 1-3

Alvin Moore & Atlanta Braves (1977)

Facts: Moore had a covenant with the Braves that stated Moore could become a free agent if he was not traded by the end of the season. This covenant is inconsistent with the CBA which mentions that only 5 year vets could be eligible for free-agency. Moore was only a 1 year vet. The player’s union sued on behalf of Moore.

Holding: Covenant between the Braves and Moore stands.

Reasoning: A Major League Baseball player and a team may agree to a contract that includes unique covenants, so long as those covenants do not infringe on the protected interests of other teams. Here, the 5 year vet standard is interpreted by the court as a provision that protects other teams. Since no interests of other teams are being protected, Moore’s covenant can stay.

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Judd’s Sports Law Outline
SPORTS LAW OUTLINE
Chapter 1 – Best Interests of the Sport: The Role of the Commissioner and Other Governing Authorities

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NetSuite Inc: Alvin Moore & Atlanta Braves … D. Arbitration as an Exclusive Remedy; § 301 Preemption

Abdul-Jalil, Superstar Management worked PRIVATE EVENTS for members of Saudi Arabian Royal Family

Abdul-Jalil and Superstar Management has worked in PRIVATE EVENTS with several members of the Saudi Arabian Royal family including His Royal Highness (HRH) Prince Al Waleed Bin Talal Bin Abdulazziz Al-Saud and his son His Royal Highness Prince Khaled bin Al Waleed bin Talal of Saudi Arabia.
Al Waleed bin Talal Al Saud is a Saudi Arabian billionaire businessman, investor, philanthropist and Royal. He was listed on Time magazine’s Time 100, an annual list of the hundred most influential people in the world, and the fifth-richest man in the world, with a net worth of nearly $28 billion! Al Waleed bin Talal’s grandfather was Saudi Arabia’s founding monarch.
His Kingdom Holding Co. spans four continents. Over the years, he has acquired major stakes in companies such as Citigroup Inc. to the Four Seasons luxury hotel chain, Apple Computer Inc., AOL Time Warner Inc., News Corp., Saks Inc.- parent of retailer Saks Fifth Avenue and owns the Disney company’s Paris resort- Euro Disneyland Paris and its sister park, Walt Disney Studios.
Euro Disney, cost more than $3 billion and is Disney’s most lavish resort, is 4,400 acres parkland, seven hotels, boasting more than 5,000 rooms designed by famed architects Michael Graves and Robert Stern, dozens of restaurants, an entertainment village designed by Frank Gehryat, and has the Paris Metro express to the site 20 miles east of Paris.
He owns the Four Seasons Hotel George V (Sanc), in the 8th arrondissement of Paris, France. An art-deco landmark built in 1928, Four Seasons Hotel George V is nestled in the Golden Triangle of Paris, just off the historic Champs-Elysees. It has oversized suites with Eiffel Tower views welcome you after a day of wandering the quaint, Parisian streets, with three restaurants – with five Michelin stars among them – are home to some of the best food in France. A decadent new spa, an elegant swimming pool and a courtyard for whiling away the afternoons with a glass of wine from our cellar are just some of the pleasures unique to our historic destination.
The prince owns three 747 jets, a 317-room castle in Riyadh (with bowling alley) and a 288-foot yacht once owned by Donald Trump he calls the “Kingdom.”

Abdul-Jalil, Superstar Management worked PRIVATE EVENTS for members of Saudi Royal Family In Giza at Pyramids

Abdul-Jalil and Superstar Management has worked in PRIVATE EVENTS with several members of the Saudi Arabian Royal family including His Royal Highness (HRH) Prince Turki Ibn Abdel Aziz and his wife His Royal Highness Princess Hend Shams El-Din El-Fassi of Saudi Arabia.
Prince Turki, a Saudi Arabian politician and businessman was a member of the House of Saud, he was the full brother of King Fahd and King Salman. Prince Turki was a member of the Sudairi Seven, a powerful faction of brothers within the Al Saud.
His parents were King Abdulaziz and Hassa bint Ahmed Al Sudairi. He was known as Turki the second because he was the second son of King Abdulaziz named “Turki”.
Prince Turki studied at the Princes’ School established by his father.
Turki bin Abdulaziz assumed the Riyadh principality delegation in 1957, because his brother Salman, governor of Riyadh (later King Salman), travelled with King Saud to Lebanon.
In 1960 he also served as the acting governor when Prince Salman was on leave.
Turki bin Abdulaziz was appointed deputy defense minister on 24 July 1969 by a royal order. His tenure lasted until 1978 when he was forced to resign from office due to his marriage to Hend Shams El-Din El-Fassi.
The stunning beautiful 20-year-old Princess Hend Shams El-Din El-Fassi, a Gulf Royalty socialite in the Mubarak era, was perhaps the FIRST Arab Feminist, in her fighting for womens liberation and rights, she became a tabloid queen. For nine years, the family and their entourage travelled the World, enjoying a lavish and outlandish culture of life that came to define the “Lifestyles of The Rich and Famous” with Robin Leach with their very own “champagne wishes and caviar dreams.” They had multiple popular destinations for vacation, recreation, and resort residences all over the world, while they retreated to Miami, Florida, USA and their compound occupied the top three floors of the Ramses Hilton, Cairo, Egypt. They also had the fabulous 5 Star Marriott Mena House Resort, in Giza at the Pyramids in Egypt.
We performed events for Princess Hend and the young Sheik Turki in Giza at the Pyramids in Egypt.